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COMPLEMENTARY AUTHORITY AND THE ONE-WAY
RATCHET: ECOSYSTEM SERVICES PROPERTY,
REGULATION; AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION
BY
KALYANI ROBBINS*
Due to the priorities of the Thump Administration, which are not a
great match with those of the conservation community, we fnd
ourselves in a period of rollbacks for all kinds of environmental
regulation, including the protection of wildlife. When the federal
government fails to adequately regulate, we look to other sources of
authority to fill that gap. The first and most obvious place to look is to
state and local governments. They are our best hope to avoid
hemorrhaging vulnerable species duinng this presidency Alas, looking
at the realties of state wildlffe conservation laws, we see the gaps
remain. Where else are we to turn? Is there any potential source of
private power that might be leveraged in favor of conservation?
Building on the author's recently published theory of ecosystem
services property, this Essay considers the extent to which that
potential property interest may operate in favor of wildlife
conservation, even where that is not the goal of those exercising the
right. While no substitute for government regulation, this approach to
property rghts may well assist in filling regulatozy gaps.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Typically when we talk about overlapping or complementary authority
over resources we are speaking of federalism-the relationship between the
federal government and state governments. This Essay considers a different,
but equally important to its context of wildlife conservation, authority
overlap: that between government regulation at any level on the one hand,
and private authority on the other. When we consider sources of authority
we often forget to take into account the power that property rights confer on
private parties-power that can support conservation policy goals or serve
as an obstacle to those goals.
Drawing on the author's recently published theory of ecosystem
services property,' this Essay demonstrates how this narrow subset of
property rights can serve to complement regulatory efforts to protect
biodiversity. Further, the concern for biodiversity conservation serves to
bolster the importance of allocating the ecosystem services property to
receiving landowners, as an allocation toward generating landowners
(owners of the natural capital) could serve to undermine regulatory
protections. If allocated as proposed, property rights in ecosystem services
would be at best beneficial and at worst harmless to wildlife, thus combining
with existing regulation in the form of a one-way ratchet in favor of
conservation. However, while ecosystem services property might enable
private parties to compensate in some ways for the conservation
shortcomings of the Trump Administration, the actual choices private actors
make are too unpredictable to serve as a substitute for regulation, so state
regulation will remain critically important during this era.
II. WILDLIFE FEDERALISM AND THE IMPACT OF REDUCED FEDERAL EFFORTS TO
CONSERVE
A. Federal and State Biodiversity Protections
Both the federal government and the states have legislation protective
of biodiversity, which can vary substantially as to both content and
implementation priorities. These powers often overlap, as federal legislation
does not preempt the entire field. All but a few states now have such statutes
1 See generally Kalyani Robbins, Allocating Property Interests in Ecosystem Services.
From Chaos to Flowing Rivers, 42 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 197 (2018).
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and list their own endangered species for protection, which demonstrates an
evolution of state priorities and perhaps a response to the development of
public trust doctrine in relation to wildlife.2 It is worth noting, in relation to
some of the points to come, that the federal Endangered Species Act3 (ESA)
was designed as it was in a world without state ESAs.
We count on the Trump Administration to implement several important
statutes for the protection of wildlife. First, the ESA, which was intended "to
halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost."'
The ESA requires the listing of threatened and endangered species for
protection, as well as the designation of their critical habitat, also to be
protected.' It prohibits "take" of individual members of a listed species by
any person, and requires all federal agencies to ensure that their actions
(including permitting or funding private actions) neither jeopardize the
continued existence of a listed species nor destroy or adversely modify its
designated critical habitat.6 Next, because the country must provide safe
passage throughout its many bird migration pathways, the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act of 19187 is also quite valuable. It makes it illegal for anyone to
take, possess, import, export, transport, sell, purchase, barter, or offer for
sale, purchase, or barter, any migratory bird without a permit, and imposes
strict liability for violations." Finally, enforcement of the Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 19729 expands on the benefits of the ESA by reaching
species not listed there (all marine mammals are protected, regardless of
their conservation status).'o While these three statutes do not represent the
full universe of U.S. wildlife legislation, they offer the greatest potential
protections for biodiversity and serve as somewhat of a trifecta by
expanding beyond the world of ESA-listed species for the critical categories
of migratory birds and marine mammals."
2 In other words, if the states have a duty, as trustees, to protect wildlife, this might lead to
greater formal protections such as endangered species laws. See Alejandro E. Camacho et al.,
Assessing State Laws and Resources for Endangered Species Protection, 47 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,837, 10,837-38 (2017) (providing a breakdown of what state endangered
species laws cover); see also Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, Comment, The Evolution of the Public
Trust Doctrine and the Degradation of Trust Resources: Courts, Tustees and Political Powerin
Wisconsin, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 135, 137 (2000) (explaining that "[tihe expansion of the public trust
doctrine has been a focal point for hopes that the doctrine will be used to curb the degradation
of... wildlife").
3 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012).
4 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180, 184 (1978) (also noting that the ESA was "the
most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any
nation").
5 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)-(b).
6 Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B); Tenn. ValleyAuth., 437 U.S. at 173.
7 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712.
8 Seeid. §§ 704-708.
9 Id §§ 1361-1423h.
10 Seeid. § 1372(a)(1).
11 For a more comprehensive description of federal wildlife legislation, see generally
Kalyani Robbins, Coordinating the Overlapping Regulation of Biodiveisity and Ecosystem
Management in THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
(Kalyani Robbins ed., 2016).
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While states initially asserted some proprietary interest in wildlife, and
still do derive some power from their public trust duties,'" the primary
source of state power over wildlife comes from police powers to regulate for
the health, safety, and welfare of the people of the state." State regulation of
wildlife largely falls within two broad categories: biodiversity protections
similar to the federal ESA, and regulation of hunting and fishing for purposes
of safety and sustained yield.14 State ESAs, sometimes referred to as "mini
ESAs," exist in all but two states (West Virginia and Wyoming lag behind in
this regard)." Unfortunately, these state statutes are inadequate to the task
of filling the federal ESA's role in the event of reduced federal regulation of
endangered species.
State endangered species legislation varies widely in terms of both
methodology and extent of coverage." Many states protect wildlife but offer
no protection for endangered plants. 8 Only eighteen states provide coverage
for all species covered within their state by the federal ESA, leaving thirty-
two states highly vulnerable to any cuts in federal implementation." Even
the eighteen states with species lists that fully overlap with the federal list
lack the funding, enforcement, and even substantive protections provided by
the federal ESA.20 As noted above, the two main areas of federal ESA
protection for listed species are the take prohibition and the requirement
that all federal agencies consult with the wildlife agencies to avoid
jeopardizing listed species. In contrast, only twelve states have any form of
interagency consultation in their statutes, and only eight of those have
meaningful provisions in this area.2' Habitat destruction is the leading cause
of species decline, and yet only five states restrict habitat modification on
private land.2 2 The upshot is that while states do have some biodiversity
protections, they are nowhere near the point at which they could serve as a
substitute for the federal ESA (and never will be). Of course, state programs
12 This doctrine holds that certain natural resources belong to the public to enjoy or use,
and the state government has an affirmative duty to preserve those resources for the public. See
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970); Scanlan, supra note 2, at 137-38.
13 Martin Nie et al., 17sh and Wildlife Management on Federal Land: Debunking State
Supremacy, 47 ENvrL. L. 797, 823 (2017); Susan Morrison Umstead, Note, Constitutional Law-
State's Interest in Wild Animals, 2 CAMPBELL L. REv. 151, 152-53, 155 (1980) (discussing states'
police power over wildlife).
14 Umstead, supra note 13, at 167-69 (discussing hunting and fishing for sustained yields);
see also Camacho et al., supra note 2, at 10,838-39 (discussing state protections similar to the
federal ESA).
15 Camacho et al., supra note 2, at 10,838-39.
16 Id. at 10,837.
17 See generally Robert L. Fischman et al., State imperiled Species Legislation, 48 ENvTL L.
81 (2018) (canvassing state laws in regard to coverage, consultation requirements, and
prohibited acts).
18 Camacho et al., supra note 2, at 10,838; Fischman et al., supra note 17, at 100 tbl.1.
19 Camacho et al., supra note 2, at 10,838.
20 Seegenerallyid.
21 Id. at 10,839; see also Fischman et al., supra note 17, at 107 tbl.2 (finding only eleven
states require interagency consultation).
22 Camacho et al., supra note 2, at 10,841.
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become extremely important in the face of reduced enforcement at the
federal level.
B. Thump Polcy and Potential Gaps
The Trump Administration moved quickly to evade its duties in relation
to biodiversity protection. Indeed, as of fourteen months in, the Center of
Biological Diversity's "Trump lawsuit tracker" is up to sixty-four-that's just
the number of times so far that this particular nongovernmental organization
(NGO) has sued the Administration, not even counting other NGOs' wildlife-
related lawsuits.2 3 Over the course of his first year in office, Trump has
opened public lands to coal leasing by reversing a moratorium on federal
coal leasing;' approved the Keystone XL pipeline that the Obama
Administration had halted;26 proposed a border wall between the United
States and Mexico that would fragment habitat and threaten vulnerable
species; 26 repealed protections for wolves, bears, and other wildlife on
Alaska's national wildlife refuges; 7 reversed a permanent ban on new
offshore oil and gas drilling in the Arctic and Atlantic oceans;"' gutted
protections for both the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument and
the Bears Ears National Monument;2 9 planned construction of a road through
the heart of Alaska's Izembek National Wildlife Refuge; 0 and permitted oil
companies to dump unlimited amounts of waste fluid, including chemicals
used in fracking, into the Gulf of Mexico." This is just a sampling.
Policy choices are always about trade-offs. We cannot have it all.
Leaders determine their priorities and then sacrifice other goals to achieve
23 See Thunp Lawsuit Tracker: 64, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, https://permacc/UZ7S-
5R58 (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (describing each of the sixty-four lawsuits filed by the Center for
Biological Diversity).
24 Ryan Zinke, Sec'y of the Interior, Order No. 3348, Concerning the Federal Coal
Moratorium (Mar. 29, 2017).
25 Notice of Issuance of a Presidential Permit to TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P., 82
Fed. Reg. 16,467, 16,467 (Apr. 4, 2017). .
26 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, AN AMERICAN BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 58 (2018).
27 Effectuating Congressional Nullification of the Non-Subsistence Take of Wildlife, and
Public Participation and Closure Procedures, on National Wildlife Refuges in Alaska Under the
Congressional Review Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 52,009, 52,010 (Nov. 9, 2017) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R.
pts. 32, 36).
28 Exec. Order No. 13,795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,815, 20,817 (May 3, 2017).
29 Proclamation No. 9682, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,089 (Dec. 8, 2017) (Grand Staircase-Escalante);
Proclamation No. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,081 (Dec. 8, 2017) (Bears Ears).
30 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. & King Cove Corp., Agreement for the Exchange of Lands (Jan.
22, 2018), https://perma.cc/4CVP-A65U; see also Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity,
Lawsuit Targets Trump Administration Plan to Bulldoze Alaska's Izembek National Wildlife
Refuge (Jan. 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/9WPW-MVAM.
31 Notice of Final NPDES General Permit; Final NPDES General Permit for New and
Existing Sources and New Dischargers in the Offshore Subcategory of the Oil and Gas
Extraction Category for the Western Portion of the Outer Continental Shelf of the Gulf of
Mexico (GMG290000), 82 Fed. Reg. 45,845, 45,845 (Oct. 2, 2017); see also Press Release, Ctr. for
Biological Diversity, Trump Administration Sued for Letting Oil Companies Dump Offshore
Fracking Waste into Gulf of Mexico (Feb. 13, 2018), https://permacc/AU35-XE65.
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them. The Trump Administration has made no effort to hide its interest in
reviving the fossil fuel industry to its pre-climate-worry glory. The
Administration sees the entire climate disruption issue as a massive hoax,"
and has little concern for natural spaces (or Native American lands) that
may be impacted by its support for oil and gas development. Just before the
end of President Trump's first year in office, the United States Department
of the Interior "rescind[ed} several climate change and conservation policies
issued under the Obama administration, saying they were 'inconsistent' with
President Trump's quest for energy independence."" Some of these changes
were significant to biodiversity protection, including policies for avoiding
activities impacting wildlife on federal land and mitigating the harms caused
by climate change and invasive species.34 Experts within the Obama
Administration invested an enormous amount of time and effort to develop a
comprehensive and scientifically up-to-date set of best practices for land
management agencies to follow, and the new Administration is tossing it all
in the wastebasket.3 5
The legislature is also seeing a rise in anti-biodiversity proposals. There
are presently five bills pending in Congress designed to significantly weaken
the ESA.36
Most relevant to this Essay, of course, are the gaps in ESA enforcement
that have begun to snowball in Trump's wildlife agencies. On October 5,
2017, the United States Fish & Wildlife Service declined to list twenty-five
petitioned species, many of which are imperiled by climate change impacts,
which the Administration is unwilling to acknowledge exist. Most notable
was the Pacific walrus, which is losing its sea ice habitat just like the listed
polar bear, and which the Obama Administration found warranted listing
(though it did not complete the listing)." Noah Greenwald, the endangered
species director for the Center for Biological Diversity, called the Trump
Administration "the worst enemy of wildlife and endangered species we
have ever seen.""
In addition to refusing to list species for protection, the Administration
is also avoiding implementation of the ESA's protections for existing listed
32 See Peter Baker, Does Donald Thunp Still Think Clmate Change Is a Hoax? No One Can
Say, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/HD6X-M7SU.
33 Juliet Eilperin, Interior Rescinds Climate, Conservation Polcies Because They're




36 See Peter S. Alagona & James Salzman, Opinion, The World's Strongest Conservation
Law Is Under Attack It Needs To Be Fixed Instead, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://perma.cc/3CJP-HHE3.
37 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Findings on Petitions to List
25 Species as Endangered or Threatened Species, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,618, 46,618 (Oct. 5, 2017) (to
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
38 Id. at 46,642-44.
39 Ramona Young-Grindle, Endangered Species Protection Stalled in Year 1 of Thump,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Dec. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/ST2U-CP5V.
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species, as well as working on new delistings of listed species.40 What all of
this means, besides the obvious reality that there will be some loss during
the Trump era, is that other sources of biodiversity protection are now more
important than ever. The next line of defense is absolutely the states, which
are best positioned to fill the gaps created by the Trump Administration, and
the more help they can provide the better. However, as noted above, state
protections are inadequate. Clearly now is the time to bolster them, but what
I propose here is simply the potential for enhancement of that effort via
private property decisions aimed at maximizing ecosystem services. This
goal is compatible with biodiversity interests the vast majority of the time,
albeit no substitute for regulation.
III. ECOSYSTEM SERVICES PROPERTY
Just as state biodiversity protections serve to complement federal
implementation of the ESA, but do not replace it, likewise property rights in
received ecosystem services could potentially add further support. Although
biodiversity protection is generally only an indirect purpose of protecting
ecosystem services (when the services are intertwined with biodiversity
protection, such as recreational services or pollination), the anthropocentric
goals and species goals enjoy mutual benefits when it comes to ecosystem
preservation or restoration.
A. What Are Ecosystem Services?
"Ecosystem services" is a concept encompassing "a wide range of
conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species
that are part of them, help sustain and fulfill human life."" Nature and the
built environment do not exist on separate planes, functioning separately
from one another (with the rare exception of where nature has been left to
do so, but humans have never functioned separately from nature, as we
cannot survive with only artificial supports). To a far greater extent than
most citizens of the earth realize, we depend on nature's services for our
own functionality, ranging from small quality-of-life enhancements to
sustaining life on earth.4 We are thus highly dependent on the functionality
40 See, e.g, Press Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Status Review Indicates Canada Lynx
Recovery in the Lower 48-States (Jan. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/G4UG-5QVP (announcing that
the Trump Administration is working to delist the Canada Lynx); Darryl Fears, Thzmp
Administration Is Taking Steps to Remove a Threatened Lynx from the Endangered-Species
List, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2018), https://perma.ce/5LXZ-KQD9.
41 Gretchen C. Daily et al., Ecosystem Services: Benefits Suppled to Human Societies by
NaturalEcosystems, ISsuEs ECOLOGY, Spring 1997, at 1, 2.
42 See Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural
Capital, 387 NATURE 253, 253-55 (1997).
43 See id at 253 ("Ecosystem functions refer variously to the habitat, biological or system
properties or processes of ecosystems. Ecosystem goods (such as food) and services (such as




of ecosystems, as their functionality can translate quite directly to our own.
When ecosystems are conserved for wildlife they are conserved for people,
and vice versa. The interests of all species, including human beings, are
inextricably linked
The still relatively new concept of ecosystem services, just over two
decades old, has undergone rapid development as a subject of study,
especially since an impressive project that brought together approximately
1,360 experts from around the globe, culminating in the 2005 Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment ("MEA report").44 The MEA report divided ecosystem
services into four categories based upon the functions they serve:
provisioning services (e.g., food or medicine), regulating services (e.g.,
pollination or regulation of air or water quality), cultural services (e.g.,
recreational or educational), and supporting services (e.g., habitat provision
or oxygenation).4 5 It has been estimated that the economic value of these
services reaches an annual average of $145 trillion,4 6 which is nearly double
the $80 trillion gross world product (GWP) of the entire earth combined.
Unfortunately, the MEA report also concluded that roughly 60% of
ecosystem services had already been degraded by human activity and that
further decline was rapidly underway.4
Indeed, in spite of our dependence on functioning ecosystems, we have
driven them to scarcity. Our growing population has resorted to sprawl,
rather than condensing itself to minimize impact and keep transportation
needs down, which "has resulted in a suburban housing abundance that has
overtaxed water supplies and infrastructure, whittled away at remaining
open spaces, displaced wildlife, altered ecosystems, and otherwise burdened
nature in irreversible ways."4 9 As we develop greater understanding of our
interdependence with nature and wildlife, we will make better decisions for
our mutual benefit, which is why shifting property power over wildlife into
the ecosystem services framework may improve our behaviors in relation to
wildlife. 0
Once we understand the full range of benefits derived from ecosystem.
services and the role they play in our lives, their relationship to property
begins to emerge. Ecosystems and their study extend well beyond the
disciplinary focus of ecology. Indeed, ecology is just one of at least three
44 See generally WALTER V. REID ET AL., MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS
AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: SYNTHESIS, at viii (Jos4 Sarukhdn et al. eds., 2005),
https://perma.cc/63HS-6SRG [hereinafter MEA REPORT].
45 See id. at 40 box. 2.1.
46 Robert Costanza et al., Changes in the Global Value of Ecosystem Services, 26 GLOBAL
ENVTL. CHANGE 152,155 (2014).
47 See The World Factbook Field Listing: GDP CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://perma.cc/RS4C-A6HT (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (estimating the 2017 gross world product
as $79.58 trillion).
48 MEA REPORT, supra note 44, at 6-11.
49 Keith H. Hirokawa, Sustaining Ecosystem Services Through Local Environmental Law,
28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 760, 767 (2011).
50 This is especially so when considering the way property rights are presently used in
relation to wildlife-largely as leverage to destroy habitat. See discussion infra Part I.A.
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disciplines at the heart of understanding ecosystem services. As J.B. Ruhl
notes, ecology, economics, and geography are all essential to understanding
ecosystem services and their roles in our lives and the economy." Our
interests in the benefits of ecosystem services that go beyond ecology serve
as inspiration to us to preserve the ecology with which all these interests are
intertwined.
This interdisciplinary nature of the study of ecosystems and the
services they provide to humanity is the result of centuries of dependence
upon them. We are only beginning to explore and understand this
dependence because of the rapid-and potentially catastrophic-decline of
the resource. This scarcity has drawn our attention to the economic value it
generates. The greater our appreciation of this economic value, and the
more power over resources falls into the hands of those who value
ecosystem services, the better for biodiversity in its own right, even if that is
not the source of motivation.
Economically valuing ecosystem services, which is an extremely
important step toward improved ecosystem management efforts,2 has
exploded in recent years. Not only have several leading legal scholars
written extensively on the subject," but an entirely new discipline called
"ecological economics" has emerged to focus on the methods of doing this.'
We still need a lot of work in this area, as our understanding of these values
lags well behind our policy development in areas informed by them.
While some ecosystem services lend themselves to valuation based on
replacement costs-frequently a much higher cost than that of preserving
the ecosystem function to be replaced5 -many services upon which we
depend cannot be artificially reproduced. For example, "valuable services
provided by soils include providing physical support for the surface
(including vegetation), nutrient cycling, hydrological regulation, waste
disposal and organic decomposition, and maintenance of soil productivity."56
The complexity and variety of these services, along with the delicate
mechanisms that enable soil to provide them, means that soil services
51 J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and Federal Public Lands: Start-Up Policy Questions and
Research Needs, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 275, 277-78 (2010) (citing J.B RUHL ET AL., THE
LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 15-83 (2007)).
52 See Deborah McGrath & Travis Greenwalt, Valuation and Payment for Ecosystem
Services as Tools to Improve Ecosystem Management in THE LAWS OF NATURE: REFLECTIONS ON
THE EVOLUTION OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT LAW & POLICY 283, 289 (Kalyani Robbins ed., 2013).
53 Eg, James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the IYeld, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 870 (2005) [hereinafter Salzman, Creating Markets] (building on his earlier work:
James Salzman, ValuingEcosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887 (1997)).
5 See, e.g, Robert L. Fischman, The EPA ' NEPA Duties and Ecosystem Services, 20 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 497, 498-99 (2001) (describing the emerging field of ecological economics and how it
might serve environmental policy).
55 COMM. ON ASSESSING & VALUING THE SERVS. OF AQUATIC & RELATED TERRESTRIAL
ECOSYSTEMS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: TOWARD BETTER
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING 125, 170-71 (2005).
56 Hirokawa, supra note 49, at 780-81 (citing Gretchen C. Daily et al., Ecosystem Services
Supplied by Soil, in NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 113,
117 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997)).
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"cannot be fully substituted by human-made solutions, and operate[] at
multiple, overlapping scales."" Consequently, "it is difficult to arrive at an
accurate economic value for these services." While this makes precision of
valuation much more challenging, it does not alter the economic nature of
the value these services provide. Indeed, in some cases the entire economic
value of a parcel of real property might depend upon the provision of
adequate soil services.
Water purification is an example of an ecosystem service that has
undergone substantial economic analysis, and no matter which approach
one uses to determine valuation, it is generally clear that a functioning
natural watershed is the best way to go:
[E]cosystems are able to naturally both supply and then filter clean water for
human use. One way to understand the economic value of intact watersheds is
to compare it to the cost of building and maintaining water supply and
treatment facilities. To the extent that loss of ecological systems results in
reduced supply, value can also be ascertained through the cost of having to
import water from elsewhere.59
Watershed protection is critical to providing populations with clean
drinking water. Soil and wetlands filter contaminants from water,"o so in
addition to developed land directly adding pollutants to the watershed, it
also removes this filtering function."' For this reason, protecting certain
lands from development can simultaneously provide for wildlife habitat and
ensure the watershed's ability to provide clean water."
One of the most famous examples of investment in ecosystem services
in order to save substantially higher replacement costs involves water
purification. New York City draws most of its tap water from upstate, in
what was a carefully developed unfiltered reservoir system.' Then the Safe
Drinking Water Acte mandated that all major surface-water systems filter
their water or prove they could protect the watershed producing it. 5 "A
filtration plant large enough to clean the City's water supply would cost
57 EARTH ECON., A NEW VIEW OF OUR EcoNoMY: NATURE'S VALUE IN THE SNOQUALMIE
WATERSHED 45 (2010) (citing Stephen Farber et al., Linlidng Ecology and Economics for
Ecosystem Management 56 BIoSCIENCE 117 (2006)).
58 Id
59 Id. at 39.
60 See Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands, 23 ENVTL. L. 1, 30
(1993) ("[M]any types of isolated wetlands play a vital role in protecting water quality by
filtering sediments and pollutants out of water and by preventing nutrient overloading.").
61 James Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 314 (2001).
62 See id at 314-15 ("Land preservation ... eliminates a major source of contamination,
while also protecting the waterway from those nonpoint sources of contamination that do
exist.").
63 Alice Kenny, Ecosystem Services in the New York City Watershed, ECOSYSTEM
MARKETPLACE (Apr. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/PP83-ZJRG.
6 42 U.S.C. H§ 300f to 300j-25 (2012).
65 Id. § 300g-1(b); Kenny, supra note 63.
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between $8-$10 billion... and another $250 million annually to [operate]."6 6
Preserving the watershed, on the other hand, was estimated at $1.5 billion.6 7
In other words, the ecosystem service of water filtration alone (never mind
the other services from the Catskills ecosystem) was worth $8-$10 billion,
but cost only $1.5 billion to preserve. On December 28, 2017, the New York
City Department of Environmental Protection announced a ten-year
extension of this unfiltered water system, thereby reaffirming its incredible
success and economic value.m
While this investment was motivated by human needs and economic
interests, consider the impact on wildlife. Instead of building a huge artificial
facility and leaving the Catskills ecosystem in decline, New York invested in
massive ecosystem restoration, creating and/or protecting habitat for birds,
aquatic life, terrestrial wildlife, and myriad plant species.66 This was done
without the necessity of an endangered species to trigger regulation and, as
such, served to complement any other protections within the area resulting
from regulated environmental dangers (including species protections). The
economic value of ecosystem services is like biodiversity's wallet.
In addition to water filtration, several jurisdictions have made
significant economic investments in wetlands in order to receive the
ecosystem service of flood prevention. The insurance industry has made
clear the economic advantages of situating land development outside high
flood-risk areas.70 This ecosystem service has such high economic value.that
in 1998, voters in Napa County, California approved an initiative to spend
$160 million on the acquisition of 500 acres of flood plain, based on the goal
of conservation of the area to significantly reduce the risk of flooding.' In
several communities around Boston, the decision was made to acquire 8,000
acres of wetlands72 rather than construct a $100 million system of dams and
levees. 3 The cost-benefit analysis between investing in ecosystem services
and developing human-made systems to replace those services can often
overwhelmingly favor the former over the latter. For this reason, the more
we integrate ecosystem services into our economic considerations the better
for conservation and thus for biodiversity.
66 Kenny, supra note 63.
67 Id; see also Salzinan et al., supra note 61, at 315-16.
68 See John Herzfeld, New York City Drinlng Water to Remain Unfiltered, BLOOMBERG
ENV'T (Dec. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/D9FV-YNVZ.
69 See N.Y.C. DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, VISION 2020: NEW YORK CITY COMPREHENSIVE
WATERFRONT PLAN 77-78 (2011), https://perma.cc/L3M5-ZW4F.
70 See STEVE LERNER & WILLIAM POOLE, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PARKS AND OPEN SPACE:
How LAND CONSERVATION HELPS COMMUNITIES GROW SMART AND PROTECT THE BoTroM LINE 35,
37 (1999), https://perma.cc/KUL7-TXYM.
71 Id at 35.




B. Property Interests in Ecosystem Services
Not all scenarios in which ecosystem services need intentional
protection to serve economic needs will be at the government scale
described in the prior subsection. In many cases there will be few property
owners involved, and the services at stake may vary from essential to merely
pleasant. The true value will typically be both subjective and complex to
determine due to myriad functions and impacts occurring simultaneously. 4
This complexity and subjectivity makes clarity of rights and interests (i.e.,
power to decide) even more important. It is also critical that we create
reliable pathways to protection of this resource, and doing so will likely
require some private investment.15 Property interests in a resource
traditionally serve to encourage such investment," or at least restraint from
destruction,77 especially where, as with ecosystems in the Trump era (and
otherwise), there is inadequate regulatory protection. 8
It is important to note, as a conceptual matter, that for ecosystem
services to make sense as property, they should touch and concern
benefitting land. It is far too abstract to suggest that we have a property
interest in, say, a view we walk by every day. That said, it makes perfect
sense to suggest that there is a property interest in ecosystem services that
maintain the livability of receiving land. That land was purchased and
developed in this ecosystem service-receiving condition, and its value may
be dependent on those services. However, this does not mean that some
ecosystem services fall outside the property paradigm, as the same
principles apply when the receiving land is public land, except that then the
ecosystem services become a part of the public trust. This serves as another
source of protection, potentially via the courts if the government entity
responsible for the receiving land is failing to meet its obligations as trustee.
Ecosystem services have been either directly or indirectly treated as
property in many contexts, including but not limited to regulatory takings,
exactions, nuisance, and markets for ecosystem services such as
conservation easements, payment programs for ecosystem services, and
wetland mitigation banking. 9 This developing property interest, and the
decisions we make regarding how it is allocated in relation to existing land
ownership, will be quite consequential to biodiversity.
74 See generally James Boyd et al., Compensation for Lost Ecosystem Services: The Need
for Benefit-Based Tansfer Ratios and Restoration Critera, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 393, 403-09
(2001) (discussing the essential components of service valuation).
75 See James Salzman et al., The Most Important Current Research Questions in Urban
Ecosystem Services, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 31-35 (2014) (discussing ways to encourage
private investment in preserving ecosystem services).
76 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 31-32 (4th ed. 1992)
(discussing the economic principles underpinning the law of property).
77 See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1247
(1968).
78 See James Salzman, A Meld of Green? The Past. and1Titure of Ecosystem Services, 21 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 133, 137 (2006) (noting the lack of legal standards for ecosystem
protections); see also discussion supra Part II.
79 See Robbins, supra note 1, at 207-20.
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IV. THE ONE-WAY CONSERVATION RATCHET
When we consider sources of authority we often forget to take into
account the power that property rights confers on private parties-power
that can support conservation policy goals or serve as an obstacle to those
goals. If allocated properly, ecosystem services property rights can serve to
complement regulatory efforts to protect biodiversity. On the one hand,
allocation toward generating landowners (owners of the natural capital)
could serve to undermine regulatory protections. On the other hand,
allocating the property rights in ecosystem services to receiving landowners
would be at best beneficial and at worst harmless to wildlife. In this way, the
authority over land use that stems from property rights can combine with
existing regulation to form a one-way ratchet in favor of conservation.
However, while ecosystem services property might enable private parties to
compensate in some ways for the conservation shortcomings of the Trump
Administration, the actual choices private actors make are too unpredictable
to serve as a substitute for regulation, so state regulation will remain
critically important during this era.
A. Property Rights as Authority over Biodiversity Impacts
Historically, property rights have provided a great deal of authority over
land use, and consequently over wildlife habitat and directly over species of
flora. This power was initially virtually unlimited, but gradually over the past
century limitations have developed, such as via zoning ordinances,
environmental regulations, or endangered species laws. That said, even in
our now more regulated world, the power wielded by landowners is
enormous. Alas, this power is resulting in rapid destruction of our
biodiversity.
Imagine that you own a tract of land and wish to develop it. It could be
the last or near-to-last area of an endangered plant, but that likely won't stop
you-as the owner of that property you hold the authority to wipe out that
plant. If there is habitat for endangered wildlife species you may destroy it
under the laws of nearly every state, as well as under the ESA if it doesn't
injure individuals of the species" (and even if it does, should the current
Administration be looking the other way)-as the owner of that property
you hold the authority to destroy that habitat. Private landowners have
redesigned the entire landscape of the country and hold nearly as much
power over land today as ever. What little power they have had to yield
returns to them in the absence of zealous enforcement of the laws that do
apply.
In addition to the power landowners have over their own parcels, they
also exercise authority over neighboring land. Nuisance litigation can serve
as power to stop a neighbor from developing her land. Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Councif' famously raised the specter of potentially treating
80 See supm note 6 and accompanying text.
81 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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destruction of ecosystem services that previously flowed to neighbors as a
common law nuisance.82 In 2003, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in
Cook v. Sulyivan" found that a nuisance was established by filling a
wetland." Interestingly, Cook and other similarly successful wetland-filling
nuisance cases have involved a private nuisance, in which the harm clearly
flows to a particular landowner. 5 Courts seem inclined to protect the rights
of landowners from the potential loss of vital ecosystem services. Public
nuisance claims, or more broadly publicly needed ecosystem services, do
not fare as well. As the Court noted in Lucas,
regulations that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or
productive options for its use-typically, as here, by requiring land to be left
substantially in its natural state-carry with them a heightened risk that private
property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of
86
mitigating serious public harm.
Given that the Lucas court would not allow such a taking (without
compensation), but would allow it if the landowner would otherwise be
violating background nuisance principles (apparently focused on
neighboring land), there is an unspoken suggestion of potential rights in the
ecosystem services at issue. If you would violate those rights, the regulation
is only stopping you from doing that which you already cannot do (violate a
neighbor's property rights), but if you are being regulated so those
ecosystem services may generally benefit the public, that is a taking of your
property interests. This demonstrates substantial authority over land
conservation stemming from private property rights. Indeed, it expressly
elevates those private property rights over the public interest.
How this private property rights perspective might work to protect
ecosystems is similar to the polluter-pays concept in the context of pollution
control." Traditionally, property rights have been viewed as in conflict with
pollution-control regulation (because it is a regulation of land use), but the
polluter-pays argument posits that requiring polluters to either refrain from
releasing anything beyond their property borders or to internalize their
externalities is necessitated by property rights-the rights of the receiving
properties.n According to this argument, the receiving properties are
experiencing harm for which they should expect a remedy." This
82 Id. at 1027-31 (explaining that in cases where the destruction would have fallen under
common law nuisance principles, legislatively prohibiting that destruction would not be a
taking).
83 829 A.2d 1059 (2003).
8 Id. at 1062, 1067-68.
85 See, e.g., id. at 1065-66.
86 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
87 See generally Robert H. Cutting & Lawrence B. Cahoon, Thinking Outside the Box:
Property Rights as a Key to En virnmental Protection, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 55 (2005) (arguing
for the "polluter-pays" concept as a method of pollution control).




perspective is also supported by Carol Rose's well-known comparison of
environmental externalities with computer virus attacks, which are in both
cases an invasion of private space.so
These arguments are exceptions to the general rule. Most scholarship
advocating for biodiversity and other environmental protections tends to
focus entirely on government regulation and ignore private property rights.
Even if raised, it is frequently only in a negative light from the
environmentalist perspective, and understandably so given the tragic
consequences privatization of the land resource has had for the conservation
of natural spaces. That said, given the immense power that stems from
private property, we should also be considering how that power might be
harnessed in favor of conservation. Property interests in ecosystem services,
in the right hands, may serve this goal.
B. Ecosystem Services Allocation Pinciples
A significant challenge to the allocation of property interests in
ecosystem services is the fact that they are intertwined with existing
property rights. There are plenty of potential conceptual bases for allocating
the right to ecosystem services. The three most obvious would be: 1)
generating landowners, meaning those whose property contains a
meaningful portion of an ecosystem providing services to others; 2)
receiving landowners, meaning those whose property benefits from
ecosystem services generated elsewhere; and 3) governments, whether state
or local, because of the importance of ecosystem services to society and the
arguable claims in both directions between property owners. In the last
example we would be placing all ecosystem services into the public trust
resource pool, thereby greatly expanding it. That said, the approaches
involving property rights in landowners (categories 1 and 2) already include
circumstances in which government entities are landowners.
So, if we treat ecosystem services as part of the real property bundle,
how might that play out? This depends in part on whether we allocate that
property interest to the generating landowner or the receiving landowner. As
described more thoroughly in the foundational article preceding this Essay,91
existing legal frameworks sometimes treat the rights to ecosystem services
as belonging to the generating landowner and sometimes place those rights
in the receiving landowner. If we were to clarify that ecosystem services
always belong to the generating landowner, they would become a divisible
part of the bundle just like mineral rights or timber rights. If, on the other
hand, we were to decide that these rights properly belong to the receiving
landowners, they would become servitudes binding the generating
landowners. Although bargaining could occur between the two parties to
90 Carol M. Rose, The Several Ftures of Property Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 148-50 (1998).
91 See generallyRobbins, supra note 1.
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shift the interest to the other party,92 this could be challenging if we don't
allocate in the inertial direction-it is easier to pay an additional expense
rolled into the overall cost of new development than to pay to maintain the
status quo (when the receiving landowner may not have the funds).
Treating ecosystem services themselves as a property interest may
require a shift away from the concept of natural capital as fully owned
property, especially in light of the fact that it often has less economic value
than the services it provides. Natural capital, a rather obviously property-
based term, refers to "the ecological resources that produce these service
values, such as forests, riparian habitat, and wetlands."94 When we view the
property interest as tied to the ecosystem itself, the notion that the right
belongs to the historically receiving party becomes strained. While we can
certainly still treat it as a servitude on the generating property, that would
not automatically inhere in the receiving land as it would traditionally be
something that should be purchased." The economic value, however, is
largely tied to the services themselves, far more than the natural capital from
which they are derived. Unlike the natural capital, which by definition sits
on the generating land, ecosystem services have historically situated
themselves in the receiving land.
It has often been said that "[m]ost environmental amenities cannot
adequately be monetized, not because they are not valuable, but because
they are not supplied through a market."9 6 This may once have been true, but
certainly is no longer entirely the case. Indeed, markets for ecosystem
services have been developing for decades now in clear, direct terms and
arguably have existed for much longer in the more subtle context of
bundling with other property interests.7 The existing markets for ecosystem
services serve to demonstrate both the failure to consistently allocate
ecosystem services in either the generating or receiving land, as well as the
importance of allocating to the receiving landowner."
There already exists several relatively easy to observe markets for
ecosystem services: conservation easements, payment for ecosystem
services (PES) programs, and wetland mitigation banking.
There are already many PES programs. They are broad and varied
overseas,"9 but tend to focus on agricultural land in the United States.iO
92 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost; 56 J.L. & EcON. 837 (2013)
(outlining the Coase theorem).
93 J.B. Ruhl, The "Background Principles" of Natural Capital and Ecosytem Services-Did
Lucas Open Pandora's Box., 22 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 525, 527-28 (2007).
94 Id. at 525 n.2.
95 See id, at 534 (noting that English common law did not extend encumbrances on land
this far).
96 David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property- A Call for Judicial Protection of
the Public's Interest in Environmentally Cridcal Resources, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 335
(1988).
97 Salzman, Creating Markets, supra note 53, at 889-90 (discussing monetization of
ecosystem services in New York in the early 1990s to improve water quality).
9 Seeid at 932, 957, 960.
99 See, e.g., Brian C. Steed, Government Payments for Ecosystem Services-Lessons from
Costa Rica, 23 J. LAND USE & ENvrL. L. 177, 185-86 (2007) (describing Costa Rica's PES
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Farmers or ranchers are paid to engage in practices that maximize certain
desired ecosystem services.'o' Such practices may include setting some land
aside or may focus more on the methods applied, and services thereby
improved may be water retention, wetland stability for filtration and flood
prevention, phosphorous load reduction, and much more.'02 The system
functions in a typical supply-and-demand manner, with local governments
purchasing those services they need. Payments should mirror or better the
forgone income relative to unrestricted use of the property at issue, as these
transactions take place when the ecosystem service value is greater than the
marginal agricultural value. As such, PES programs maximize the
economically efficient use of land.
Unfortunately, PES is not a panacea for solving the problem of
ecosystem services loss. Situating the rights to those services in the
generating landowners creates significant moral hazards, placing
landowners in a position of power over society that may encourage bad
behavior and extortion.' Moreover, PES forces taxpayers to pay, maximizes
transaction costs, and "may undermine intrinsic motivations for
conservation and debilitate preexisting social markets." Experience with
PES thus far highlights the need to clearly allocate the property interest in
ecosystem services, and supports the preference for doing so in favor of
receiving properties.
Conservation easements are another common approach to marketing
ecosystem services. Indeed, this is another typical way (besides eminent
domain or consensual land acquisition) to maintain water filtration services
and avoid expensive artificial water treatment. Many conservation easements
are purchased in order to maintain essential habitat for dwindling species,
though even in such cases one can extrapolate human value for the ecosystem
service. Of course, conservation easements are already understood as
property, like all easements. In this sense they are arguably the most concrete
example of ecosystem services as property.00
program); see also Salzman, Creating Markets, supra note 53, at 892-93 (describing Australia's
pilot PES program).
100 For a discussion of such programs, see generally J.B. Ruhl, Agriculture and Ecosystem
Services: Strategies for State and Local Governments, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 424 (2008).
101 Id. at 426, 446-47.
102 Id. at 446-47.
103 Id at 428-29.
104 Stefanie Engel et al., Designing Payments for Environmental Services in Theory and
Practice: An Overview ofthe Issues, 65 ECOLOGIcAL EcoN. 663, 669, 670 n.23 (2008).
105 Marcia Silva Stanton, Payments for Freshwater Ecosystem Services: A Framework for
Analsis, 18 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 189, 283-85 (2012).
106 Robbins, supra note 1, at 217 (footnote omitted); see Jessica Owley, Changing Property
in a Changing World A Call for the End of Perpetual Conservation Easements, 30 STAN. ENVrL.
L.J. 121, 139 (2011) ("When conservation easements preserve environmental resources on
private lands where purchase or regulation would be burdensome, undesirable, or politically
difficult, conservation easements can yield the public benefits of increased environmental
amenities and healthy functioning ecosystem services.").
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Unfortunately, because they must generally be purchased from the
owner of the natural capital, they too (like PES programs) imply an
allocation of ecosystem services property in the generating land.
Were we to place the ecosystem services property right in the receiving
landowners we would effectively create (by default, without a transaction) a
limited (to ecosystem services provision) conservation easement on all
remaining natural capital. This would not render further development
impossible (though we are indeed at a stage in which we should be
considering limiting development to already developed lands), but it would
mean that the total cost of the development would reflect the destroyed
ecosystem services value, as that right would need to be purchased from the
receiving landowner. This, of course, is beneficial to protecting biodiversity.
A third example of markets for ecosystem services is wetland
mitigation banking.' 7 A wetland mitigation bank is a typically large area of
wetlands that the "banker" has acquired, restored, and will preserve going
forward, although the banker is not required to do so under any legal
regime.'" This voluntary effort and expense is in fact a business investment,
as the banker has now generated numerous wetland credits that it may in
turn sell to. developers seeking to destroy wetland property, as the
developers will be required to mitigate the damage they do by restoring a
wetland elsewhere in order to obtain a permit."9 Because these developers
are not themselves in the business of restoring wetlands, nor own any
wetland property to restore (apart from the wetland they wish to fill), it is
often preferable to them to buy these credits from a mitigation bank and be
done with it."o This also maximizes efficiency by centralizing the task and
managing it with expertise rather than as an addition to a development
project."'
Wetlands provide such localized ecosystem services that it is generally
necessary that they be in a certain proximity to those to be destroyed (in
order to replace the lost ecosystem services), so these banks have popped
up all over the country. The original federal guidelines for wetland
mitigation banking provided that "[t]he objective of a mitigation bank is to
provide for the replacement of the chemical, physical and biological
functions of wetlands and other aquatic resources which are lost as a result
of authorized impacts.""2 "This is a now well-developed market for
ecosystem services-when a developer wishes to destroy ecosystem
services upon which the community depends, he must purchase them
elsewhere in order to replace what he is taking.""3 This concept also
107 See J.B. Ruhl & R. Juge Gregg, Integrating Ecosystem Services into Environmental Law:
A Case Study of Wetlands Migation Bankng, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 365, 365-67 (2001).
108 Id
109 Id. at 368-72.
110 See id at 371-72; see also Robin Meadows, Weland 1itigadon Banldng, ECOSYSTEM
MARKETPLACE (Jan. 1, 2001), https://perma.cc/BM2K-KUYG.
111 Meadows, supra note 110.
112 Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed.
Reg. 58,605, 58,607 (Nov. 28, 1995).
113 Robbins, supra note 1, at 218.
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arguably lays the groundwork for a theory of ecosystem services-based
liability. The recipients of the ecosystem services have an entitlement to
continue receiving them, so one who would destroy them must
simultaneously replace them.
As noted in my initial article presenting my theory of ecosystem
services property:
With a positive thing of value flowing from one property to another, having
done so since prior to their ownership and typically prior to all previous
ownership, the best way to protect the property interest in maintaining status
quo is through allocating the property interest where it already lies: in the
receiving property The preexisting ecosystem services are part of the value of
the receiving property. Perhaps if the sending landowner were actually
generating the ecosystem services, rather than purchasing land that has long
generated them in his absence, it might make sense to grant him rights in this
114interest-that would render the services a positive externality. But the
natural and preexisting ecosystem services themselves-now deemed a thing
of economic value and thus capable of ownership-have always been a part of
the receiving property.
C ComplementaryAuthoityas One-Way Ratchet
The benefits ecosystem services property rights could provide to
biodiversity, while certainly no replacement for regulation, are potentially
quite substantial. The more that human beings seek to protect their security
in ecosystem services the better our interests align with those of
biodiversity. Both are buoyed by maximizing the integrity of our remaining
natural (or quasi-natural) ecosystems.
As described in Part IV.A, property rights are a source of authority
resting in private parties instead of in governments. Focusing solely on
government authority to achieve our policy goals ignores a valuable source
of potentially complementary authority. If we ignore this source of authority
because we have a distaste for it, that doesn't make it go away. Rather than
ignore the private property rights authority, it behooves us to ensure that the
tools are in place to encourage the use of that authority as a complement to
our regulatory strategies and not an obstacle to them. By recognizing the
property interest in ecosystem services as belonging to the historically
receiving landowner, we can harness this complementary authority over
nature and render it a one-way ratchet in favor of conservation.
114 "This also distinguishes manmade ecosystem services, such as a wetland mitigation
banking (assuming it was developed via restoration), from natural ecosystem services, which
are the focus of this [discussion]. It is perfectly reasonable to allow people to invest in the




D. The Inadequacy ofPropertyAuthority Makes State Regulation More
Important than Ever
It is important to make absolutely clear that ecosystem services
property, while carrying the potential to benefit biodiversity, has highly
limited and unreliable benefits. As such, it is unlikely to ever serve as a
substitute to regulation, even though it may complement regulatory efforts.
Even if allocated to recipients of ecosystem services, who derive benefits
from those services and thus have an incentive to protect the ecosystems
generating them, as a property right it would be transferrable. Under some
(and possibly many) circumstances the holders of these rights would sell
them to the owners of the natural capital who wish to destroy it for other
economic benefits. That right would be unconstrained absent regulation, so
regulation is no less necessary in the context of property rights in received
ecosystem services. The benefit to biodiversity comes from this added
hurdle to the destruction of natural capital, along with aligning the power
with those whose interests are most served by the intact ecosystem, but
there remains no guaiantee regarding the unrestricted private party choices.
V. CONCLUSION
The modern emergence of property interests in ecosystem services, if
allocated to the historically receiving landowners, aligns well with the
interests of biodiversity. As such, it serves as a complement to conservation
regulation, which is especially valuable when there is inadequate
enforcement of the latter. While it cannot substitute for regulation, the range
of potential impact is from zero to beneficial, making it a one-way ratchet in
favor of conserving biodiversity.
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